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Evan Thompson

University of British Columbia, Philosophy, Faculty Member

Indian Philosophy +20

I am no longer maintaining this page. Visit evanthompson.me for information about my research and downloadable publications.
Address: Department of Philosophy
University of British Columbia
Vancouver Campus
1866 Main Mall
Buchanan E370
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1
Canada

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Books

Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy.

Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions

Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind

The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness

Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Papers

Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation and Philosophy

by Vikram Zutshi and Evan Thompson

Science and Nonduality

The Philosophy of Mind-Wandering

by Zachary Irving and Evan Thompson

Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought, 2018

Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begi... more Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begin with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated or stimulus-independent. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto centre stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations that researchers must overcome to move forward. Specifically, the standard definitions do not account for (i) the dynamics of mind wandering, (ii) task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mind-wandering, and (iii) the ways that mind-wandering can be task-related. We then survey three philosophical accounts that improve upon the current psychological definitions. We first present our account of mind-wandering as “unguided thinking”. Next we review Thomas Metzinger’s view that mind-wandering can be defined as thought lacking meta-awareness and cognitive agency, as well as Peter Carruthers’s and Fabian Dorsch’s definitions of mind-wandering as disunified thinking. We argue that these latter views are inadequate, and we show that our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking is not only conceptually and phenomenologically precise but also can be operationalized in a principled way for empirical research.

Hypnosis and meditation: a neurophenomenological comparison

by Jelena Markovic and Evan Thompson

Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective

by Evan Thompson and Aaron Henry

Own-Body Perception

by Evan Thompson and Alisa Mandrigin

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014

Dynamics of neural recruitment surrounding the spontaneous arising of thoughts in experienced mindfulness practitioners

by Kieran Fox, Kieran Fox, matt dixon, Sean Pritchard, and Evan Thompson

Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain syste... more Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated 17 withtheearlyinceptionofathoughthasprovedchallenging.Hereweaddressedthisissuebytakingadvantageof 18 theheightenedintrospectiveabilityofexperiencedmindfulnesspractitionerstodetecttheonsetoftheirsponta- 19 neously arising thoughts. We observed subtle differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited 20 byspontaneousthought.Onlyinsomeoftheseregionsdidneuralactivationpeakpriortothespontaneousaris- 21 ingofathought—mostnotablyinthemedialtemporallobeandinferiorparietallobule.Incontrast,activationin 22 themedialprefrontal,temporopolar,mid-insular,lateralprefrontal,anddorsalanteriorcingulatecorticespeaked 23 together with or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought. We propose that brain regions that 24 show antecedent recruitment may be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, 25 while those that show later recruitment may be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration and 26 metacognitive processing of spontaneous thoughts. Our findings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural re- 27 cruitment surrounding the emergence of spontaneous thoughts and may help account for some of spontaneous 28 thought's peculiar qualities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention.

Is thinking really aversive? A commentary on Wilson et al.'s "Just think: the challenges of the disengaged mind

by Evan Thompson and Kieran Fox

Frontiers in psychology, 2014

Self‐No‐Self ? Memory and Reflexive Awareness

Self, No Self?, 2010

Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness

Strengthening emotion-cognition integration

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2015

Pessoa&amp;amp;#39;s (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in... more Pessoa&amp;amp;#39;s (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in two ways: first, by clarification and refinement of key concepts and terminology, and second by the incorporation of an additional key neural system into the model, the locus coeruleus/norepinephrine system.

Contemplative Neuroscience as an Approach to Volitional Consciousness

Understanding Complex Systems, 2009

Coloured thoughts on perception

Francisco J. Varela (1946–2001)

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001

Affect-biased attention as emotion regulation

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2012

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation... more The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;affect-biased attention&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39; - the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others - provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.

Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy.

Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions

Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind

The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness

Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation and Philosophy

by Vikram Zutshi and Evan Thompson

Science and Nonduality

The Philosophy of Mind-Wandering

by Zachary Irving and Evan Thompson

Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought, 2018

Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begi... more Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begin with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated or stimulus-independent. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto centre stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations that researchers must overcome to move forward. Specifically, the standard definitions do not account for (i) the dynamics of mind wandering, (ii) task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mind-wandering, and (iii) the ways that mind-wandering can be task-related. We then survey three philosophical accounts that improve upon the current psychological definitions. We first present our account of mind-wandering as “unguided thinking”. Next we review Thomas Metzinger’s view that mind-wandering can be defined as thought lacking meta-awareness and cognitive agency, as well as Peter Carruthers’s and Fabian Dorsch’s definitions of mind-wandering as disunified thinking. We argue that these latter views are inadequate, and we show that our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking is not only conceptually and phenomenologically precise but also can be operationalized in a principled way for empirical research.

Hypnosis and meditation: a neurophenomenological comparison

by Jelena Markovic and Evan Thompson

Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective

by Evan Thompson and Aaron Henry

Own-Body Perception

by Evan Thompson and Alisa Mandrigin

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014

Dynamics of neural recruitment surrounding the spontaneous arising of thoughts in experienced mindfulness practitioners

by Kieran Fox, Kieran Fox, matt dixon, Sean Pritchard, and Evan Thompson

Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain syste... more Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated 17 withtheearlyinceptionofathoughthasprovedchallenging.Hereweaddressedthisissuebytakingadvantageof 18 theheightenedintrospectiveabilityofexperiencedmindfulnesspractitionerstodetecttheonsetoftheirsponta- 19 neously arising thoughts. We observed subtle differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited 20 byspontaneousthought.Onlyinsomeoftheseregionsdidneuralactivationpeakpriortothespontaneousaris- 21 ingofathought—mostnotablyinthemedialtemporallobeandinferiorparietallobule.Incontrast,activationin 22 themedialprefrontal,temporopolar,mid-insular,lateralprefrontal,anddorsalanteriorcingulatecorticespeaked 23 together with or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought. We propose that brain regions that 24 show antecedent recruitment may be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, 25 while those that show later recruitment may be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration and 26 metacognitive processing of spontaneous thoughts. Our findings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural re- 27 cruitment surrounding the emergence of spontaneous thoughts and may help account for some of spontaneous 28 thought's peculiar qualities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention.

Is thinking really aversive? A commentary on Wilson et al.'s "Just think: the challenges of the disengaged mind

by Evan Thompson and Kieran Fox

Frontiers in psychology, 2014

Self‐No‐Self ? Memory and Reflexive Awareness

Self, No Self?, 2010

Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness

Strengthening emotion-cognition integration

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2015

Pessoa&amp;amp;#39;s (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in... more Pessoa&amp;amp;#39;s (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in two ways: first, by clarification and refinement of key concepts and terminology, and second by the incorporation of an additional key neural system into the model, the locus coeruleus/norepinephrine system.

Contemplative Neuroscience as an Approach to Volitional Consciousness

Understanding Complex Systems, 2009

Coloured thoughts on perception

Francisco J. Varela (1946–2001)

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001

Affect-biased attention as emotion regulation

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2012

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation... more The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;affect-biased attention&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39; - the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others - provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.

<i>Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction</i> (review)

Philosophy East and West, 2012

Is Internal Realism a Philosophy of Scheme and Content?

Metaphilosophy, 1991

... At any rate, Davidson's realism is neither internal nor metaphysical. Metaphysical reali... more

Own-Body Perception

Color vision: A case study in the Foundations of Cognitive Science

Revue De Synthese, 1990

Philosophical theories of consciousness: Continental perspectives

Philosophical theories of consciousness: Asian perspectives

by Evan Thompson and Georges Dreyfus

Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories

by Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton

Topoi, 2009

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science an... more This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.

Keywords: Enaction; Extended mind; Autonomy; Sense-making; Emotion; Embodiment; Incorporation.